Like-Minded by Elizabeth A Wilson & Adam Frank
I
Like-Minded
Author(s): Adam Frank and Elizabeth A. Wilson
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 38, No. 4, Agency and Automatism: Photography as Art Since
the Sixties, edited by Diarmud Costello, Margaret Iversen, and Joel Snyder (Summer 2012),
pp. 870-877
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/667428 .
Accessed: 27/09/2012 08:14
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .






Adam Frank and Elizabeth A. Wilson
Ruth Leys (“The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry 37 [Spring
2011]: 434–72) raises a number of important questions about the concep-
tual and empirical underpinnings of the affect theories that have emerged
in the critical humanities, sciences, and social sciences in the last decade.
There are a variety of frameworks for thinking about what constitutes the
affective realm (neurological, psychological, social, cultural, philosophi-
cal), and there are different preferences for how such frameworks could be
deployed. We would like to engage with just one part of that debate: the
contributions of Silvan Tomkins’s affect theory. We take issue with Leys’s
formulation that Tomkins’s work along with that of Brian Massumi, Wil-
liam Connolly, and Paul Ekman form a group of like-minded theorists.
We do not believe this represents an accurate account of the conceptual
and empirical commitments of these various authors. By bundling their
work together, Leys misses much of what is compellingly critical in each of
these writers, and she overlooks what is most invigorating in the debates
amongst them. In addition, the specificities of Tomkins’s work have been
badly served in Leys’s essay. In four volumes stretching from 1962 to 1992 (and
elaborated in various other empirical and theoretical papers) Tomkins laid out
a complex and captivating theory of the human affect system, in which mech-
anisms of neurological feedback, social scripts, and facial behavior coassemble
as affective events. Our response to Leys’s essay is motivated by a wish to see
more detailed engagements with this theory—the distinctiveness of which we
believe has yet to be fully explored in this new affective turn.
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In the first instance, we note, with some surprise, that Leys sees Tom-
kins as extensively influential on research in both the sciences and the
critical humanities. If only. On our reading of the current scientific, social
scientific, and critical humanities literatures on emotion, Tomkins’s work
has been either ignored or persistently misunderstood. Leys begins her
essay by arguing that “for the past twenty years or more the dominant
paradigm in the field of emotions [stems] from the work of Silvan S. Tom-
kins and his follower, Paul Ekman” (p. 437). We will return to Leys’s de-
scriptions of the precise character of this influence (for example,
Tomkins’s alleged contention that “affective processes occur indepen-
dently of intention or meaning” or “our basic emotions do not involve
cognitions or beliefs about the objects in our world” [p. 437]) and begin by
contesting the first part of this claim: that Tomkins’s theory has been a
governing force in contemporary research on affect. Even a cursory review
of contemporary psychology textbooks will show that references to Tom-
kins are incredibly brief.1 These textbooks tend to envisage the history of
psychological theory on emotion in a fairly uniform way. That is, after
Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals the main
theorization of affect in the twentieth century can be traced through
the authorial pairs of James/Lange, Cannon/Baird, and Schachter/
Singer. Tomkins’s work is squeezed into this conventional narrative
only to the extent that he is taken to revive the Darwinian (categorical)
theory of emotion, and then his contribution is quickly (and, in our
view, inaccurately) fused with that of Paul Ekman. These introductory
texts also leave other important aspects of Tomkins’s work unad-
dressed; his script theory and his extensive work in personality testing,
for example, lie fallow.
1. See Henry Gleitman, James Gross, and Daniel Reisberg, Psychology (New York, 2011);
Michael Eysenck, Psychology: A Student’s Handbook (East Sussex, 2000); and Robin Kowalski
and Drew Westen, Psychology (Hoboken, N.J., 2009) for typical treatments of Tomkins’s
contributions to the discipline of psychology.
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The specialist textbooks on emotion and personality theory barely im-
prove on this accounting. The personality textbooks may summarize his
script theory, and most will mention his employment at the Harvard Psy-
chology Clinic under Henry Murray, but his extensive and reputable work
on the Picture Apperception Test is all but ignored.2 The emotion text-
books contain summaries of Tomkins’s affect theory, but what we would
like to note—as this bears directly on Leys’s claims—is that all these texts
take Tomkins’s work to be part of the tradition in which a cognitive ap-
praisal mechanism is central to emotional response. While this is a clear
enough account of Ekman’s work on emotion, it is a grave misunderstand-
ing of Tomkins’s. He and Ekman are very different theorists on this point.
Tomkins certainly argues that cognitions combine with affects (“Cogni-
tions coassembled with affects become hot and urgent. Affects coas-
sembled with cognitions become better informed and smarter”);3 however
he was a strong critic of contemporary cognitive theories of affect ap-
praisal. In volumes three and four of Affect, Imagery, Consciousness (pub-
lished in 1991 and 1992 after the so-called cognitive revolution had
swallowed the discipline of psychology whole), Tomkins is clear that he
finds cognitive theories of affect evocation underpersuasive:
What is the cognitive appraisal when one is anxious, but does not
know about what, when one is depressed or elated but about nothing
in particular? Even more problematic for such theory is infantile af-
fect. It would imply a fetus in its passage down the birth canal collect-
ing its thoughts and, upon being born, emitting a birth cry after
having appraised the extrauterine world as a vale of tears. [AIC, 3:56]
It is appraisal-based theories of emotion—not Tomkins’s theory—that
have dominated research on emotion these last twenty years or more.4 We
take Leys’s heuristic of a “Tomkins-Ekman account of the emotions” (p.
440) to be a significant misconstruction.
2. See, for example: Dan P. McAdams, The Person: An Introduction to the Science of
Personality Psychology (Hoboken, N.J., 2009); Irving B. Weiner and Roger L. Greene, Handbook
of Personality Assessment (Hoboken, N.J., 2008); The Cambridge Handbook of Personality
Psychology, ed. Philip Corr and Gerald Matthews (Cambridge, 2009); and Lawrence Pervin and
Oliver John, Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research (New York, 2001).
3. Silvan Tomkins, Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, 4 vols. (New York, 1962–92), 4:7;
hereafter abbreviated AIC.
4. What counts as appraisal in the psychological literature on emotion varies somewhat.
For his part, Ekman argues that appraisal (“in which we are constantly scanning our
environment for those things that matter to us”) is a defining characteristic of emotion, even if
such appraisal is usually automatic and nonconscious (Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed:
Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life [New York, 2003],
p. 216).
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Following on from this, we find Leys’s claim for Tomkins’s influence
over Ekman and thus over the scientists who draw on Ekman to be over-
stated. For example, the recent research on emotion in computational
science tends to draw on categorical distinctions between basic affective
states, and it is possible to draw a citational line that connects, say, Kismet
(the “emotional robot” built at MIT in the 1990s) to Ekman, and then back
to Tomkins.5 But the crucial discovery here is that key aspects of Tomkins’s
affect theory in relation to shame, feedback, and cognition have not sur-
vived their relocation into computational models of emotion. It is Ekman,
not Tomkins, who holds sway in these domains. We would like the impor-
tant differences between Tomkins and Ekman to remain salient in discus-
sions about affect theory; we would point out, as well, that Ekman’s
influence on scientists and nonscientists alike derives largely from those
points where he diverges from Tomkins. Ekman’s notion of basic emotions
likely draws more sustenance from The Expression of the Emotions in Man
and Animals than it does from Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. For example,
Ekman’s introduction to Oxford’s two-hundredth-anniversary edition of
Darwin’s text insists on an antirelativist agenda that would sound out of
place in Tomkins’s writing, in which universalizing intentions are consid-
erably nuanced by a marked anthropological interest in personality and
culture. Simply put, not all theories of basic emotion are alike; Leys’s de-
cision to group them together speaks more to her need to strengthen a
rhetorical position than it accurately reflects the details of these bodies of
work.
Similarly, and against Leys’s claim for wide interdisciplinary influence,
there is almost no sustained commentary on, or use of, Tomkins’s work in
the critical humanities. Irrespective of whether one is part of the affective
turn or rallying against it, there is very little engagement with the particu-
lars of Tomkins’s theory.6 Most often, in fact, Tomkins’s theoretical claims
are gleaned from Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s writings rather than Tomkins
5. See Elizabeth A. Wilson, Affect and Artificial Intelligence (Seattle, 2010), chap. 2.
6. There is almost no mention of Tomkins in the most widely circulated books on affect;
see Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York, 2004); Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary
Affect (Durham, N.C., 2007); Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004);
The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, ed. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley
(Durham, N.C., 2007); John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic
(Minneapolis, 2009); and Political Emotions: New Agendas in Communication, ed. Janet Staiger,
Ann Cvetkovich, and Ann Reynolds (New York, 2010). Similarly, the critiques of Clare
Hemmings and Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard move over the specificities in
Tomkins in order to focus on Sedgwick and Massumi; see Clare Hemmings, “Invoking Affect:
Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn,” Cultural Studies 19, no. 5 (2005): 548–67, and
Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard, “Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn to Affect,”
Body and Society 16, no. 1 (2010): 29–56. In the recently published The Affect Theory Reader, ed.
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himself; rarely does anyone engage the lengthy, difficult, and compelling
prose in Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Rarer still is any uptake of his work
outside those four volumes (the studies on affect and smoking, for exam-
ple, or his work on ideology). Our point is not that these authors should
have used Tomkins’s work; we simply note that they do not.7
All this makes Leys’s claim about influence and like-mindedness hard to
sustain. We feel that she shares with mainstream psychology an inclination
for broad, synthesizing accounts of the history of affect theory, an inclina-
tion that tends to wash out the color and distinctiveness of these different
intellectual positions.
We move now from Leys’s claim about Tomkins’s influence to her
misunderstanding of several important aspects of his theory: the relation-
ship between affect and object, the faciality of affect, and the place of
intention or purpose (what Tomkins calls imagery) in his theory. First,
Leys asserts that, for Tomkins, “affects are only contingently related to
objects in the world: our basic emotions operate blindly because they have
no inherent knowledge of, or relation to, the objects or situations that
trigger them” (p. 437); she goes on to suggest that, in Tomkins’s model,
“the way to understand fear or joy is that they are ‘triggered’ by various
objects, but the latter are nothing more than tripwires for an inbuilt
behavioral-psychological response” (p. 438). Leys is right to note the im-
portance of the notion of trigger for Tomkins but wrong in the way she
casts the relationship between trigger and object in his theory; she appears
to conflate a distinction that Tomkins carefully and crucially maintains.
Tomkins reserved the word trigger to name the neurological process that
occasions the experience of affect; in his quite general formulation, distinct
gradients in “the density of neural firing or stimulation” are specific trig-
gers for the affects of anger, distress, enjoyment, and so on (AIC, 1:251).
This formulation permits him to arrive at one of the most productive
aspects of his theory: the freedoms of affect with respect to time, intensity,
combination, and (especially) object.
One of Tomkins’s recurrent examples of the freedom of affect with
respect to object is the infant’s cry: the child who cries is not necessarily
aware of the object of its distress. Is he or she hungry? wet? hot? cold? The
various cries occasioned by each of these situations have similar neurolog-
Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg (Durham, N.C., 2010) only two of the eighteen authors
(Anna Gibbs and Megan Watkins) engage the details of Tomkins’s work.
7. It is a small, perhaps petty, point to note that Tomkins’s first and/or last names are
frequently misspelled in the scientific, social scientific, and humanities literatures that make
fleeting use of his work.
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ical triggers—for Tomkins, this is how they are all cries of distress—but
they have very different objects. When Leys suggests that “Tomkins-
inspired theorists consider the affects to be capable of discharging them-
selves in a self-rewarding or self-punishing manner without regard to the
objects that elicit them” (p. 438), she appears to be describing the dynamics
of Sigmund Freud’s understanding of sexuality rather than Tomkins’s un-
derstanding of affect. The stability of the trigger permits any affect to have
any object; any number of objects or situations can occasion similar neu-
rological profiles. But once triggered, an affect comes to inform its object
in a complex manner that Tomkins terms “affect-object reciprocity,” in
which, as he puts it, “the object may evoke the affect, or the affect find the
object,” leading to a “subjective restructuring of the object” (AIC, 1:133–
34). This can hardly be described as affects behaving “without regard to the
objects that elicit them.” Rather, the freedom of affect with respect to
objects leads to the possibility of a motivational system of great flexibility.
Indeed, the key contribution that Tomkins’s affect theory makes to
psychology is to the question of motivation. Charting a course between the
psychoanalytic emphasis on the drives and the behaviorist insistence on
stimulus/response, Tomkins argued that affects are the primary motiva-
tors of human behavior. While drives and cognitions both have motiva-
tional power, it is only when they are amplified by affect that a human
being is moved to act, according to Tomkins. Consider the everyday ex-
ample of hunger: often enough we realize our hunger only when we feel
distress or irritation. When we eat, it is both to alleviate our hunger and to
improve our mood—just as, if we like to eat good food, it is because we
seek enjoyment as much as (or more than) the satisfaction of the hunger
drive. In focusing on the basic emotions paradigm and assimilating Tom-
kins’s theory to Ekman’s, Leys does not address how Tomkins offers a new
theory of motivation. Following from this, she overlooks the other crucial
terms besides (and beside) affect in the title of his major work: imagery and
consciousness.
We would like to correct an inaccurate assertion that Leys makes with
regard to Tomkins’s understanding of the faciality of affect. She writes, in
describing the basic emotions paradigm: “On this conception, when our
facial expressions are not masked by culturally determined or conven-
tional ‘display’ rules that control for appropriate social behavior, our facial
displays are authentic read-outs of the discrete internal states that consti-
tute our basic emotions” (p. 438). This is not how Tomkins understands
the faciality of affect. One of his primary interlocutors on this topic is
William James, for whom emotion mostly takes place internally, in the
bodily organs. But Tomkins offers a different theory of the primary loca-
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tion of affect: “affect is primarily facial behavior” (AIC, 1:205–6) or, as he
puts it, “We regard the relationship between the face and the viscera as
analogous to that between the fingers, forearm, upper arm, shoulders and
body. The finger does not ‘express’ what is in the forearm, or shoulder or
trunk. It rather leads than follows the movements in these organs to which
it is an extension” (AIC, 1:205). The face does not serve, as Leys puts it, as a
site for “read-outs” of “internal states,” and it is not only social display
rules that make it difficult to read or recognize emotions. Rather, our
tendency to experience multiple, contradictory affects at the same time,
assembled with one another as well as with cognitions and drive states,
makes facial affect difficult to assess. These complex emotional assem-
blages are embedded in scripts that serve to negotiate our motivational
realities, and while these scripts may be somewhat visible on the face—the
old-fashioned word for this would be character—they require interpreta-
tion, something which a good therapist might be skilled in. In addition,
because for Tomkins the face (and the voice, though he does not address
this in any detail) is where affect primarily takes place, his theory makes it
possible to pursue a revised notion of emotional expression that does not
require falling back into an idealized, self-authenticating interiority.8
Leys’s most charged contention is that intention has no place in Tom-
kins’s affect theory. But this is simply not true. Tomkins theorizes inten-
tion by way of what he calls the Image, defined as “a blueprint for the
feedback mechanism: as such it is purposive and directive” (AIC, 1:122).
Tomkins’s notion of imagery is indebted to first-order cybernetic theory in
which purposes can be understood as emergent properties of some com-
plex systems. We do not have the space to fully explicate Tomkins’s theory
of the Image, but a brief example should help to clarify his distinction
between affects (the primary motives) and Images (as specific goals or
purposes). Consider that one of us experienced some anger and distress on
reading Leys’s essay. These feelings served to motivate a response, but this
response could have taken any number of forms (fuming to one’s partner,
complaining to a colleague). In crafting this written reply we have a specific
purpose: to correct what we perceive to be misrepresentations of Tom-
kins’s theory and its place in the critical and scientific literatures. We es-
pecially do not want graduate students who are forming their professional
allegiances to be able confidently to dismiss “the affective turn” because it
allegedly does not accommodate the role of intention. The particular Im-
age we have in mind, then, is of a reader, either swayed by Leys’s critique
or, perhaps, without the vocabulary or knowledge required to respond to
8. See Adam Frank, “Medium Poe,” Criticism 48 (Spring 2006): 149–74.
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it convincingly, who reads this reply and can think more clearly about
Tomkins’s theory, and about the possible importance of having a viable
affect theory (or theory of motivation) for criticism.
There would be more to say about the stakes behind Leys’s insistence on
a radical opposition between affect and intention (or meaning or ideology,
terms which Leys tends to assimilate to one another) where there is none.
No doubt an analysis of these stakes would begin with the citation, in
footnote 31 (p. 451), to William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley’s “affective
fallacy”: a moment of the highest New Critical attempt to scientize and
purify literary criticism. Leys appears to be returning to that old defense of
authorial intention as the only way to assign meaning to a literary text, a
horse that was beaten to death in these pages more than twenty years ago.
The spectacle would be amusing if it weren’t so discouraging, if it didn’t
give the distinct sense that madness this way lies.
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